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Abstract
Employment tax credit programs have been repeatedly used during economic
crises, although their usefulness is empirically contestable. The objective of this
paper is to quantify the tax effects of employment tax credit programs. A recent
revision of the German inheritance tax law provides an eminent opportunity to an-
alyze the effects caused by such a preferential treatment. The tax liability depends
on a company’s future employment expenses. Hence, we use micro-level data of
realized business transfers from the German Inheritance Tax Statistic and combine
them with a simulation of the future development of employment over the rele-
vant time-horizon. We identify the magnitude of tax reductions granted to business
transfers under a preferential treatment. Further, we demonstrate that these re-
ductions are considerably larger in times of economic growth. Our findings also
suggest that employment tax credits have pro-cyclical effects and specifically foster
transfers between unrelated parties. Finally, the preferential treatment of business
transfers does not provide incentives to increase employment.
JEL-Classification: C15, H30, K34
Keywords : Alternative tax treatments, Employment tax credits, Inheritance tax, Simu-
lation
∗We thank the Research Data Centre of the German Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical
Offices of the La¨nder for providing us with micro-level inheritance tax data. We are also grateful to
participants of the 2nd EIASM Workshop on Current Research in Taxation in Muenster, the 2013 EAA
Annual Meeting in Paris, and colleagues in the MannheimTaxation (MaTax) ScienceCampus for their
valuable comments on previous drafts of this paper. Dennis Voeller gratefully acknowledges financial
support by the Fritz Thyssen Foundation and the Julius Paul Stiegler Memorial Foundation.
†Corresponding author: Chair of Business Administration and Accounting, University of Mannheim,
68131 Mannheim, Germany, e-mail: voeller@bwl.uni-mannheim.de, phone: +(49) 621-181 1638, fax:
+(49) 621-181 1665.
1 Introduction
Employment tax credits tied to the creation or preservation of jobs have been regarded
an instrument to alleviate the consequences of economic crises. For example, the United
States enacted federal programs such as the Work Opportunity Tax Credit, which was
introduced in 1996 and reauthorized and amended multiple times, or the HIRE Act of
2010. Further, employment tax credit programs have been enacted in the proceedings of
the financial crisis, e.g., in Japan in 2011 (Ministry of Finance Japan, 2010) or in France in
2013 (Competitiveness and Employment Tax Credit - CICE).1 The intention of these pro-
grams has been to stimulate the employment of specific groups of workers or employment
in general (Neumark, 2011; Heaton, 2012). However, empirical evidence on the efficacy of
employment tax credit programs with respect to labor demand is mixed.2 Besides the un-
certain effects on the labor market, the exclusive applicability of employment tax credits
to business property has initiated controversial debates: proponents argue that a lower
tax burden on business property helps to create or secure jobs and thereby serves the
public welfare. Opponents criticize the legitimacy of the asymmetric treatment of private
and business transfers. In a current decision, the German Federal Supreme Tax Court
doubts that the effective treatment of business property under the German inheritance
tax law is consistent with the German Constitution (BFH, 2012). A final decision on
this issue is to be expected from the German Federal Constitutional Court in fall 2014.3
Another prominent example for this type of discussion is the US administration’s plan for
a business tax reform that envisions the elimination of seemingly unjustified subsidies and
a broader tax base as a precondition for a more effective tax system (The White House
(ed.), 2012).
The objective of our paper is to quantify the tax effects of employment tax credit
programs.4 For this purpose, we exploit a recent reform of the German inheritance tax
law, where two alternative types of employment tax credits have been introduced. Relying
on the proponents’ argument, the German government explicitly refers to the preservation
of jobs as a justification, see (Deutscher Bundestag, 2008, p. 1). However, estimates of the
German government encourage the opponents’ doubt concerning the legitimacy of positive
discrimination of business property. The inheritance tax revenue is expected to drop from
4.7 billion EUR to 2.7 billion, i.e., by 44%, due to the introduction of employment tax
credits. Therefore, evidence on the tax effects of employment tax credits is useful not
1 Additionally, employment tax credit programs focused on certain groups of employees are implemented
all over the world, e.g., the Apprenticeship Job Creation Tax Credit (AJCTC) in Canada or tax credits
in conjunction with the Skills Development Act in South Africa.
2 See, for example, the controversial discussion of the New Jobs Tax Credit (NJTC) program, a similar
tax credit that was designed as a political response to the recession in the mid-1970s, by Perloff and
Walter (1979), and Bartik and Bishop (2009). For a current overview of tax structures and tax credits
in the G7 countries see e.g., Profeta et al. (2014) pp. 734-739.
3 For a description of the ongoing legal proceeding see BVerfG, 2012.
4 This study focuses on tax credits that grant a tax relief to employers, but not to employees.
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only from a legislator’s perspective but also from an economic point of view.
The German setting is particularly useful for our analysis as it offers two employment
tax credit alternatives that differ with regard to their employment requirements and
the tax reduction they provide. Our analysis is based on proprietary micro-level data
from the German Inheritance Tax Statistic of 2011. Specifically, we use information on
the value of the transferred property and on the applicable tax bracket of all German
business transfers.5 The final inheritance tax under both alternatives depends on future
employment expenses. Due to the multi-period design of the new tax law enacted in
2008, resulting tax payments are not finally determined before 2016. Hence, we simulate
employment expense paths for all individual business transfers to quantify the effects of
employment tax credits on tax payments.
Our results contribute to the literature in three ways: First, the study provides evi-
dence on effective inheritance tax rates levied on business transfers in Germany. Thereby,
it adds to the long-lasting political and judicial controversy about the preferential treat-
ment of business property (Houben and Maiterth, 2011). Under the employment tax
credit program, more than 95% of the considered business transfers remain effectively un-
taxed. In contrast, if only tax exemptions available to private transfers could be used, this
would only hold for 64% of the transfers. The average effective tax rate can be lowered
from 4.14% to only 0.05%. The results also indicate that tax benefits are significantly
larger for the transfer of large properties. For example, the average effective tax rate on
large transfers is between 0.53% and 1.61% under the preferential treatment for business
transfers, compared to an average tax rate of 21.41% that would be levied on private
transfers. Transfers that fall into a low tax bracket due to a close legator-successor re-
lationship tend to benefit less from the preferred tax treatment. As these transfers are
subject to a lower tax rate and enjoy higher tax exemptions even in the absence of any
preferential treatment for business transfers, their additional tax reductions are smaller.
Thus, an abolishment of preferential provisions for business transfers would lead to a more
progressive tax system and is likely to affect intergenerational succession planning.
Second, the study provides detailed results with regard to the size of the transferred
property and to the relation between legator and successor, which adds to the continuing
debate about tax progressivity and tax effects on succession planning (Pickety and Saez,
2007; Kopczuk, 2013). Therefore, we focus on those transfers that would lead to a tax
payment under private taxation.6 They are more likely to benefit from a preferential
treatment. As expected, taxpayers’ benefits from employment tax credits are even bigger
5 To ensure privacy of the tax filings that is protected by German law, the data is not publicly available.
Therefore, our analyses are conducted in cooperation with the Research Data Centre of the German
Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the La¨nder.
6 As mentioned before, about 64% of the transfers would not have to pay inheritance tax even in the
absence of any preferential provisions for business transfers, due to tax exemptions on the personal
level, etc.
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for this subsample. On average, the effective tax rate can be lowered to 0.15%, compared
to an average effective tax rate of 11.54 % in the absence of any preferential treatment.
The average tax wedge between small and large transfers can be reduced from 11.65% to
0.43% under a preferential treatment.
Third, our findings suggest that the benefits of employment tax credits are lower under
a recession scenario, which suggests pro-cyclical effects of the employment tax credit
program. Thus, our results do not support the popular notion of employment tax credit
programs as a counter-cyclical instrument. Our analyses neither suggest that employment
tax credits provide incentives to increase employment merely to realize additional tax
reductions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the insti-
tutional setting. Section 3 presents the research design and descriptive statistics. The
results are reported and discussed in Section 4. In Section 5, we present multivariate anal-
yses to validate the robustness of our findings and address endogeneity concerns. Section
6 summarizes the key findings of the study and concludes.
2 Institutional setting
Since the reform of 2008, the German inheritance tax law offers two employment tax
credit alternatives for business successions.7 The reform was justified with the prevention
of liquidity constraints that might jeopardize the continuation of transferred businesses.
Moreover, it should provide incentives to maintain employment levels after a business
transfer. The German inheritance and gift tax is levied on the net property received by
the successor. Both alternatives, denoted as “standard plan” and “option plan”, grant
tax credits for successors who maintain a prescribed level of employment expenses over a
certain period of time after transferring the business. However, the alternatives differ with
respect to their specific expense thresholds, time horizons, and applicable tax exemptions.
The standard plan requires a 15% definitive taxation of the transferred estate X after a
deduction of all available tax exemptions, TESP , at t = 0. Tax exemptions depend on the
relation between the legator and the successor. As in many European countries, transfers
between close relatives enjoy fiscal advantages (for an overview see Næss-Schmidt et al.,
2011; Eurostat - European Commission, 2012). That is, additional tax exemptions can be
used compared to third-party transfers.8 Under the standard plan, additional exemptions
7 In the following, we use the term inheritance tax for the German inheritance and gift tax. With some
minor exceptions, e.g., a special tax exemption for children after the death of their parents, transfers
after death and transfers by gift are treated equally under German law. In the US, the term estate
tax is more frequently used. For a detailed description of the US estate tax system see, for example,
Batchelder (2009).
8 For example, a tax exemption of 500,000 EUR can be used by spouses under German inheritance tax
law. Children are entitled to a tax exemption of 400,000 EUR. Grandchildren and parents (in case
of death) can use tax exemptions of 200,000 EUR or 100,000 EUR, respectively, while more distant
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apply if the employment expenses, WSP , aggregated over five years following the business
transfer exceed four times the initial employment expenses, 4 · w0. Thereby, the average
employment expenses, w0, paid in the five years preceding the business transfer serve as
a basis for the computation. If the requirement is met, 85% of the transferred net estate
remain untaxed. If employment expenses fall short of the threshold, the tax exemption
is linearly reduced. If tax exemptions are not completely exhausted in t = 0, remaining
exemptions can be used in period t = 5. Therefore, the tax base for the standard plan,
TBSP , can be computed as:
9
TBSP = (0.15 ·X −min{0.15 ·X ;TESP})
+ 0.85 ·X ·max
{
0; 1−
WSP
4 · w0
−max
{
0;
TESP
0.85 ·X
−
0.15
0.85
}}
. (1)
While only 85% of the transferred estate remain untaxed if the expense threshold is
met under the standard plan, meeting the threshold under the option plan guarantees that
the business transfer is not taxed at all. Under the option plan, aggregated employment
expenses, WOP , have to exceed seven times the initial expenses, 7 ·w0, in the seven years
after the transfer to completely avoid taxation. The tax exemption is again linearly
reduced, if employment expenses are below the threshold. The tax base under the option
plan, TBOP , is:
TBOP = X ·max
{
0; 1−
WOP
7 · w0
−
TEOP
X
}
. (2)
Analogous to the provision of tax exemptions, the applicable tax rate, tSP or tOP ,
also depends on the relationship between the legator and the successor. German tax law
differentiates between transfers between close relatives such as children or spouses (tax
bracket 1), transfers to, for example, siblings, parents, or parents-in-law (tax bracket 2),
and transfers without a close family relationship (tax bracket 3). Within each tax bracket,
a progressive tax schedule is applied meaning that tax rates rise in the value of the tax
base. For example, statutory tax rates range from 7 to 30% in tax bracket 1 or from 30
to 50% in tax bracket 3, depending on the value of the transferred property. Figure 1
illustrates the applicable statutory tax rates based on the respective tax brackets under
the German inheritance tax law.
Based on the respective tax bases, TBSP and TBOP , and the applicable statutory tax
rates, tSP and tOP , we are able to determine the expected tax payment of an individual
under both alternatives. We denote the expected tax payments as TSP and TOP respec-
tively. The expected tax payments allow for a comparison of tax consequences resulting
from the two employment tax credit alternatives. For the standard plan, the present value
relatives and non-related parties are only provided with a tax exemption of 20,000 EUR.
9 For a detailed description of the tax computation see Simons et al. (2012, p. 7).
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Figure 1: Statutory Tax Rates According to German Inheritance Tax Law
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This figure provides statutory tax rate according to German inheritance tax law (§19 I and III ErbStG)
depending on the applicable tax base and the respective tax bracket. The statutory tax rate ti with
i ∈ {OP, SP, PRIV } is expressed in percent, and the tax base TB is in million euro. The solid line
represents statutory tax rates for tax bracket I, the dashed line for tax bracket II, and the dotted line for
tax bracket III.
of the expected tax payments is given by:
TSP = tSP · (0, 15 ·X −min{0.15 ·X ;TESP}) (3)
+ tSP ·
0.85 ·X
(1 + r)5
·max
{
0; 1−
WSP
4 · w0
−max
{
0;
TESP
0, 85 ·X
−
0.15
0.85
}}
.
The first summand represents the 15% share of the taxable estate that is taxed directly
after the succession. The second summand represents the subsequent taxation if the
expense threshold is not met, i.e., WSP < 4w0. The present value of the expected tax
payments under the option plan is:
TOP =
tOP ·X
(1 + r)7
·max
{
0; 1−
WOP
7 · w0
−
TEOP
X
}
. (4)
Finally, we compute those tax payments that would occur in the absence of any prefer-
ential treatment of business property, i.e., we assume that the transfer of the business is
subject to the tax rules for transfers of private property. This serves as a benchmark for
the employment tax credit alternatives. The present value of the expected tax payments
is denoted as TPRIV and given by:
TPRIV = tPRIV ·max{0;X − TEPRIV }. (5)
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3 Research design
3.1 Inheritance Tax Data
We make use of proprietary micro-level data from the Inheritance Tax Statistic of 2011
provided to us by the Research Data Centre of the German Federal Statistical Office. The
data covers all transfers for which a tax assessment has been done in 2011. The tax statis-
tic provides detailed individual information about the value of transferred property, and
about the relation between the legator and the successor. To determine the tax effects of
the described employment tax credit alternatives, we obtain the actual values of all trans-
ferred business properties X assessed in 2011.10 We use this information to determine the
applicable tax bracket and tax exemptions that would be granted under current legislation
for each business transfer. This procedure is necessary, as many transfers included in the
Inheritance Tax Statistic of 2011 are not taxed according to the current legislation. The
two employment tax credit alternatives introduced in 2008 are based on a time horizon of
up to seven years. Given the typical duration of a tax assessment process, comprehensive
evidence on actual tax payments under currently valid law is not yet available. Hence,
we use the available transfer data as input for the subsequently described simulation.
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the 14,800 business transfers included in the
German Inheritance Tax Statistic of 2011. The variable X is the value of the transferred
business property in thousand euro. TE16, TE17, and TE13a are simulated tax exemptions
that would have been granted under current legislation based on the value of the business
property and the applicable tax bracket of a specific transfer recorded in the data.11 TE16
depends on the relation between legator and successor, which also defines the applicable
tax bracket for a business transfer. It ranges from 20,000 euro for transfers between
unrelated parties up to 500,000 euro granted for transfers between spouses. TE17 is a tax
exemption that is specifically granted to spouses and underage children. However, it does
not apply for inter vivos transfers. Therefore, we use information about the cause of each
transfer and about the successor provided by the inheritance tax statistic to determine
the appropriate amount. As one might expect, the descriptive statistics suggest that this
tax exemption has a minor impact on the tax burden as only a relatively small number
of successors receive this exemption. The average amount is 29,260 euro. Finally, TE13a
is an exemption tied to the use of the standard plan. The exemption is 150,000 euro for
a value of transferred property below 1 million euro and linearly reduces toward zero for
values between 1 million and 3 million euro. As the standard and the option plan result in
tax payments at different points in time, differences in the present value of tax payments
under both methods might occur. We assume in our calculations that the interest rate r
10 For practical problems in determining the value of transferred business see e.g., Mu¨ller and Sureth
(2011). Note that we exclude all transfers not considered to be business successions.
11 The indices represent the corresponding paragraphs of the German inheritance tax code.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics - Inheritance Tax Statistic
Panel A: Full Sample
Var. Mean SD P25 P50 P75 N
X 1,394.77 25,343.77 26.18 150.00 459.83 14,800
TE16 317.13 171.40 200.00 400.00 400.00 14,800
TE17 29.26 80.83 0.00 0.00 0.00 14,800
TE13a 138.89 35.48 150.00 150.00 150.00 14,800
Panel B: By Tax Bracket
Var. Mean SD P25 P50 P75 N
Tax Bracket 1
X 1,173.98 6,056.57 58.09 216.59 561.39 11,624
TE16 398.32 81.78 400.00 400.00 400.00 11,624
TE17 37.26 89.56 0.00 0.00 0.00 11,624
TE13a 136.85 38.19 150.00 150.00 150.00 11,624
Tax Bracket 2
X 3,593.14 70,075.72 5.79 23.54 99.55 1,846
TE16 19.99 0.42 20.00 20.00 20.00 1,846
TE17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1,846
TE13a 145.74 22.83 150.00 150.00 150.00 1,846
Tax Bracket 3
X 273.16 2,439.53 3.72 11.42 52.41 1,330
TE16 19.99 0.49 20.00 20.00 20.00 1,330
TE17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1,330
TE13a 147.17 19.28 150.00 150.00 150.00 1,330
Panel C: By Value of Transferred Property
Var. Mean SD P25 P50 P75 N
Small
X 129.09 135.66 15.21 76.33 214.27 11,354
TE16 297.87 181.08 20.00 400.00 400.00 11,354
TE17 28.52 79.94 0.00 0.00 0.00 11,354
TE13a 150.00 0.00 150.00 150.00 150.00 11,354
Medium
X 1,060.45 533.41 633.33 868.81 1,381.91 2,658
TE16 384.65 109.62 400.00 400.00 400.00 2,658
TE17 33.79 85.93 0.00 0.00 0.00 2,658
TE13a 131.82 30.14 121.36 150.00 150.00 2,658
Large
X 20,759.10 108,000.00 3,544.85 5,595.43 12,680.43 788
TE16 366.87 124.88 400.00 400.00 400.00 788
TE17 24.76 75.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 788
TE13a 2.58 7.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 788
This table provides a description of the inheritance tax data considered in the empirical analysis. Panel
A reports summary statistics for the full sample of 14,800 business transfers included in the German
Inheritance Tax Statistic of 2011. Panels B and C show summary statistics for subsamples divided by
the tax bracket and the size of transferred property, respectively. X represents the value of transferred
business properties as reported in the statistic. TE16, TE17, TE13a are summary statistics of simulated
tax exemptions that would be granted under current legislation, given the property value, the chosen tax
credit alternative, and the tax bracket of a specific transfer. All values are reported in thousand euro.
is equal to zero.
Panel A shows descriptives based on the full sample. It seems that many tax ex-
emptions exceed the value of the transferred property. Hence, no taxation would occur
irrespective of the level of employment expenses. For example, the 75th percent quantile
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of the transferred properties is smaller than the accumulated amount of tax exemptions
at the same quantile. While an individual transfer is not necessarily attributable to the
same quantile in all variables, the probability that total tax exemptions exceed the value
of the transferred property is high. Hence, we separate the sample by tax brackets and
value of transferred property. Panel B shows summary statistics for each of the three
tax brackets. Both property values and tax exemptions vary by the tax bracket of the
successor. Property values that are transferred to successors that have a more distant
or no family relationship with the legator (tax bracket 3) are considerably smaller than
property values transferred in tax bracket 1 or 2. Besides the apparent tax incentives - tax
bracket 1 provides lower tax rates and additional tax exemptions compared to tax bracket
3 - there obviously exist numerous non-tax reasons for this finding, especially given the
important role of family businesses in Germany (e.g., Miller et al., 2003). In Panel C we
differentiate by the value of transferred property. Small transfers are defined as transfers
with a property value up to 500,000 euro, medium transfers have a property value be-
tween 0.5 and 2.5 million euro, and large transfers exhibit a property value of more than
2.5 million euro.12 The descriptive statistics show that 76% of all business successions
are transfers below 500,000 euro. However, they also suggest that for the remaining 24%
of the cases, property values exceed the available tax exemptions considerably. Thus,
significant tax payments could be expected in the absence of employment tax credits.
3.2 Simulation
As described in Section 2, employment tax credits are tied to aggregate expense thresholds
that have to be met within the next five years for the standard plan, or seven years for the
option plan. In order to determine the expected tax payments under the two alternative
employment tax credit programs, we simulate sequences of annual employment expenses
for each business transfer. We simulate 25 expense paths per tax credit alternative over
the next five or seven years for each business transfer. We standardize the initial expenses
w0 to one since only the relative development with respect to the initial level of expenses
is relevant for tax purposes. Annual employment expenses, wt, are drawn from a normal
distribution with N (gjt × wt−1, vt × wt−1) for t > 0, where wt−1 is the simulated expense
from the previous period, gjt is the expected expense growth for an economic scenario
j, and vt × wt−1 is the standard deviation of the distribution. Each step relies on the
last drawn expense level implying that our simulated expense realizations have a Markov
property. This leads to a path dependence within each run. We further set negative draws
to zero as employment expenses cannot be negative by definition, and assume vt = 0.1 ∀t.
At last, we aggregate the simulated annual employment expenses over the respective time
12 The respective intervals are chosen based on the classification of the public version of the German
Inheritance Tax Statistic of 2011.
8
Table 2: Simulation of Economic Scenarios
Panel A: Expected Expenditure Growth Rates
t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 t = 5 t = 6 t = 7
Base Scenario Standard Plan 0.40 -0.60 1.70 2.70 3.60 – –
Option Plan 0.40 -0.60 1.70 2.70 3.60 0.30 2.80
Recession Scenario Standard Plan -6.20 -1.60 -2.20 -1.70 -5.70 – –
Option Plan -6.20 -1.60 -2.20 -1.70 -5.70 -2.70 -1.60
Panel B: Employment Expenses under Different Scenarios
Var. Mean SD P25 P50 P75 N
Base Scenario Standard Plan WSP 5.14 0.77 4.61 5.10 5.63 370,000
Option Plan WOP 7.34 1.25 6.46 7.25 8.12 370,000
Recession Scenario Standard Plan WSP 4.49 0.69 4.01 4.45 4.93 370,000
Option Plan WOP 6.10 1.06 5.36 6.03 6.77 370,000
This table provides an overview of the simulated economic scenarios. Panel A reports the annual growth
rates of the expected employment expenses in percent. Growth rates are used to simulate annual em-
ployment expenses under a base and a recession scenario. Panel B shows summary statistics for the
aggregated employment expenses that result from the simulation procedure. They are reported as factors
compared to the average employment expense paid in the five years preceding the transfer.
horizon, i.e., WSP =
∑5
t=1wt and WOP =
∑7
t=1 wt.
13
We consider two different economic scenarios – represented above by the index j – for
the expected expense growth in our simulation. Both scenarios rely on historical develop-
ments of aggregated salaries and wages in Germany capturing different macro-economic
circumstances. This enables us to examine the impact of the macro-economic develop-
ment on the effective tax burden. The first scenario, referred to as “base scenario”, relies
on the average annual growth rates of salaries and wages in Germany from 2003 to 2010
as reported in the German national accounts (Destatis, 2011). Panel A of Table 2 shows
the annual growth rates used in the simulation. As can be seen in the table, a moderate
wage increase has been observed in 6 out of 7 years. In one year a slight decrease of wages
(0.6%) occurs. The purpose of this scenario is to serve as a realistic reference point to
evaluate the effects of employment tax credits under an average economic development.
In contrast, the second scenario, referred to as “recession scenario”, relies on the average
development in the German mining industry between 2001 and 2008.14 The mining in-
dustry displayed the lowest growth of all industries considered in the national accounts.
Wages shrunk in all periods with rates between -1.6% to -6.2%.
Panel B of Table 2 reports aggregated employment expenses under both scenarios that
result from the simulation. Given the 14,800 business transfers reported in the inheri-
tance tax statistic and 25 simulated expense paths per transfer, our simulation consists
of 370,000 individual runs for each tax credit plan and scenario. The results show that
13 For an illustration see Figure 2.
14 For the mining industry, growth rates of wages and salaries are only provided until 2008 by the national
accounts.
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Figure 2: Simulated employment expense paths
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(a) Base scenario (b) Recession scenario
This figure illustrates 100 simulated expense paths under each of the two scenarios. The lines connect
the means of the distribution used in the simulation as given in Table 2.
under the base scenario, mean and median values of employment expenses lie considerably
above the thresholds that have to be met under the two tax credit alternatives. If the less
restrictive standard plan is chosen more than 75% of the cases exceed the expense thresh-
old. Thus, the results suggest that under an average economic development a majority of
taxpayers is able to fully enjoy the tax reductions offered by the two tax credit alterna-
tives. This picture changes under a recession scenario. While still more than 75% exceed
the threshold under the standard plan, employment expenses are considerably below the
levels that are required under the option plan.
Figure 2 depicts a simulation of 100 randomly chosen employment expense paths.
Figure 2(a) shows the base scenario, and Figure 2(b) shows the recession scenario. We
additionally report the means of the distribution used in the simulation as given in Table
2. Therefore, the mean of the 100 randomly chosen realizations differs from the reported
means while a majority of realizations is still near the underlying means of the distribu-
tion. For all scenarios the spread between minimum and maximum employment expenses
increases over time reflecting the problem of forecast uncertainty faced by the individual
taxpayer.
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4 Results
We divide the analysis into three parts. First, we present results for the full sample that
comprises simulated outcomes based on all business transfers included in the German
Inheritance Tax Statistic of 2011 under the base scenario. We focus our discussion on
how option plan, standard plan, and a non-preferential treatment affect the effective tax
burden, i.e., we analyze τi for i ∈ {OP, SP, PRIV }. Further, we identify the percentage of
cases with an effective tax rate of zero, qi for i ∈ {OP, SP, PRIV }. Moreover, we consider
effects caused by a variation of the tax bracket, or by the value of the transferred property.
Overall, this part of the analysis provides a representative overview of the inheritance tax
burden on business transfers in an average economic environment with moderate growth
rates.
Second, we focus on those cases that would be taxed in the absence of any preferential
treatment. Thus, we exclude cases for which tax exemptions under private taxation are
already sufficient to avoid tax payments. As a consequence, differences in the tax burden
between private taxation and the two employment tax credit alternatives mainly reflect
tax reductions linked to the development of employment expenses. We therefore provide
a detailed analysis of the effects of employment tax credits not only under the base but
also under a recession scenario.
Third, we use a multivariate approach to simultaneously consider various factors that
affect the effective tax rate and the probability to pay taxes.
4.1 Full sample analysis
In Table 3, we provide simulation results for the full sample under the base scenario
described in Section 3.2. Panel A shows that both plans that are available to business
transfers provide a considerable reduction in effective tax rates compared to the treatment
of private transfers.15 While private transfers would be subject to an average effective tax
rate of 4.14%, effective tax rates are 0.09% under the standard plan and 0.05% under the
option plan. The most apparent reason for this finding is the high percentage of transfers
that result in no tax payment at all. The preferential treatment of business transfers
results in a zero tax rate for 97.1% of the simulation runs if the option plan is chosen.
While the fraction of untaxed transfers is slightly lower under the standard plan, it is still
considerably higher than it would be under the regime for transfers of private property
(64.1%). Thus, an abolishment of the preferential treatment would lead to a significantly
higher effective tax burden on business transfers, and it would raise the number of taxable
property transfers.
In Panel B, we report specific results for three subsamples that are split according
15 Effective tax rates are computed as the percentage share of tax payments in the value of transferred
property before any tax exemption, i.e., Ti/X , for i ∈ {OP, SP, PRIV }.
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Table 3: Simulation Results
Panel A: Full Sample
Tax Plan Var. Mean SD P25 P50 P75 N
Full Sample
Standard Plan τSP 0.09 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 370,000
qSP 94.7 0.00 94.7 94.7 94.7 370,000
Option Plan τOP 0.05 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 370,000
qOP 97.1 0.00 97.1 97.1 97.1 370,000
Private Taxation τPRIV 4.14 7.51 0.00 0.00 5.01 370,000
qPRIV 64.1 0.00 64.1 64.1 64.1 370,000
Panel B: By Tax Bracket
Tax Plan Var. Mean SD P25 P50 P75 N
Tax Bracket 1
Standard Plan τSP 0.09 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 290,600
qSP 94.2 0.00 94.2 94.2 94.2 290,600
Option Plan τOP 0.03 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 290,600
qOP 97.9 0.00 97.9 97.9 97.9 290,600
Private Taxation τPRIV 3.15 6.15 0.00 0.00 3.02 290,600
qPRIV 67.3 0.00 67.3 67.3 67.3 290,600
Tax Bracket 2
Standard Plan τSP 0.13 0.71 0.00 0.00 0.00 46,150
qSP 95.5 0.00 95.5 95.5 95.5 46,150
Option Plan τOP 0.12 0.66 0.00 0.00 0.00 46,150
qOP 93.4 0.00 93.4 93.4 93.4 46,150
Private Taxation τPRIV 7.54 9.46 0.00 2.26 13.59 46,150
qPRIV 46.5 0.00 46.5 46.5 46.5 46,150
Tax Bracket 3
Standard Plan τSP 0.1 0.65 0.00 0.00 0.00 33,250
qSP 97.3 0.00 97.3 97.3 97.3 33,250
Option Plan τOP 0.15 0.84 0.00 0.00 0.00 33,250
qOP 95.0 0.00 95.0 95.0 95.0 33,250
Private Taxation τPRIV 8.05 11.54 0.00 0.00 18.55 33,250
qPRIV 60.6 0.00 60.6 60.6 60.6 33,250
to the legator-successor relationship. As described on page 4, business transfers between
more distant relatives or to an unrelated party fall into higher tax brackets under German
law. Differentiating between the three tax brackets allows for an evaluation of the effects
that employment tax credits have on different groups of taxpayers. This is particularly
important as differences in the taxation of diverse types of taxpayers provide incentives for
succession planning. As expected our results show that in the absence of any preferential
treatment, the applicable tax bracket heavily affects both the effective tax rate and the
probability of paying taxes. The average effective tax rate under the tax rules applied
to private property is only 3.15% for tax bracket 1, but 7.54% for tax bracket 2, and
8.05% for tax bracket 3. In contrast, average effective tax rates under the option and
the standard plan do not exceed 0.15% even for tax bracket 3. Thus, the preferential
treatment of business transfers under current legislation reduces the effective tax burden
considerably. Further, it virtually removes differences in the effective taxation of transfers
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Table 3: Simulation Results (continued)
Panel C: By Value of Transferred Property
Tax Plan Var. Mean SD P25 P50 P75 N
Small
Standard Plan τSP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 283,850
qSP 100.0 0.00 100.0 100.0 100.0 283,850
Option Plan τOP 0.02 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 283,850
qOP 98.9 0.00 98.9 98.9 98.9 283,850
Private Taxation τPRIV 1.73 5.2 0.00 0.00 0.00 283,850
qPRIV 82.3 0.00 82.3 82.3 82.3 283,850
Medium
Standard Plan τSP 0.04 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 66,450
qSP 96.6 0.00 96.6 96.6 96.6 66,450
Option Plan τOP 0.06 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 66,450
qOP 96.3 0.00 96.3 96.3 96.3 66,450
Private Taxation τPRIV 9.32 6.83 3.70 8.20 13.73 66,450
qPRIV 5.50 0.00 5.50 5.50 5.50 66,450
Large
Standard Plan τSP 1.61 1.43 0.41 1.29 2.48 19,700
qSP 11.4 0.00 11.4 11.4 11.4 19,700
Option Plan τOP 0.53 1.34 0.00 0.00 0.10 19,700
qOP 73.0 0.00 73.0 73.0 73.0 19,700
Private Taxation τPRIV 21.41 6.38 16.82 17.78 26.40 19,700
qPRIV 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 19,700
This table provides effective tax rates and the percentage of transfers with a zero tax rate based on
all business transfers provided in the German Inheritance Tax Statistic 2011. τSP , τOP , τPRIV denote
effective tax rates under the standard plan, the option plan, and in the absence of any preferential
treatment for business transfers, respectively. qSP , qOP , qPRIV denote the percentage of transfers with
a zero effective tax rate under each tax treatment. All values are reported in percent. For each business
transfer, 25 employment expense paths are simulated according to the base scenario described in Section
3.2. Panel A reports results of 370,000 simulation runs based on the full sample of 14,800 transfers.
Panels B and C show summary statistics for subsamples by tax bracket and size of transferred property.
that belong to different tax brackets. Transfers between more distant relatives or among
unrelated parties especially benefit from the current rulings.
However, the applicable tax bracket is not the only determinant of the tax burden.16
For example, the percentage of runs that result in no tax payment is lower for tax bracket 2
(46.5%) than for tax bracket 3 (60.6%), although the available tax exemptions for this tax
bracket are higher. An apparent explanation for this finding is that the average value of
transferred property is lower in tax bracket 3 than in tax bracket 2 (see Table 1). In Panel
C, we therefore present results for three subsamples that are grouped according to the
value of transferred property, see page 8. The results clearly show that the employment
tax credits soften the progressivity of the tax scheme. While the average effective tax rate
under private taxation would be 21.41% for transfers above 2.5 million euro, choosing the
option plan allows taxpayers to only pay an average effective tax rate of 0.53% on large
transfers. The choice of the option plan also leaves 73% of the large transfers untaxed,
16 We jointly consider the effect of multiple factors in Section 5.1, where we extend our analysis to a
multivariate setup.
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while every large transfer would be taxed in the absence of a special treatment of business
property. Thus, large transfers especially benefit from the special treatment. However,
it must be noted that for large business transfers, the choice of an adequate fiscal plan
plays a rather important role in reducing the effective tax burden. Under the standard
plan, average and median effective tax rates are well above 1% and only 11.4% of the
simulation runs result in no tax payment.
4.2 Isolating the effects of employment tax credits
Next, we focus on those cases that might actually benefit from a preferred tax treatment of
business transfers compared to private taxation. That is, we report findings for successions
that would result in a tax payment if the current inheritance tax rules for transfers of
private property would be applied. This subsample consists of 35.9% of all simulation
runs shown in Table 3.17 For the other transfers, generally granted tax exemptions would
be sufficient to avoid any taxation. Thus, we examine those runs that are most likely
to be affected by the employment tax credit. This allows us to isolate the effects of the
preferential treatment of business property.
Table 4 presents the findings from a simulation of employment expenses according
to the base scenario. Panel A contains all 132,725 runs of Table 3 that result in a tax
payment without preferential treatment. Panels B and C show summary statistics for
subsamples divided by the tax bracket and the size of transferred property, respectively.
Not surprisingly, the distribution of transfers with regard to the tax brackets and the
value of transferred property differs from the one in Table 3. For example, 14.84% of the
transfers included in the restricted sample have a property value above 2.5 million euro,
compared to only 5.32% in Table 3.
For this subsample, tax reductions are even larger compared to the full sample analysis.
The special tax treatment of business property substantially alleviates taxation if other
tax exemptions are not sufficient to completely avoid taxation. The average effective tax
rate under private taxation is 11.54%, while employment tax credits, and additional tax
exemptions for business property, help to reduce the tax burden to only 0.15% (0.26%) if
the option plan (standard plan) is chosen. Moreover, up to 91.8% (85.2%) of the runs that
would lead to tax payments under private taxation remain untaxed under the option plan
(standard plan). Panel B confirms our prior finding that an abolishment of a preferential
treatment for business properties would especially hurt transfers between distant relatives
or between parties without a family relationship. While those transfers would be subject
to an effective tax rate of 20.44% percent under private taxation, the current treatment
allows for an effective tax burden of only 0.37% under the option plan and even 0.25%
under the standard plan. The results also confirm the previous finding that the current
17 Slight deviations regarding the number of runs are rounding differences.
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Table 4: Simulation Results - Base Scenario
Panel A: Full Sample
Tax Plan Var. Mean SD P25 P50 P75 N
Full Sample
Standard Plan τSP 0.26 0.81 0.00 0.00 0.00 132,725
qSP 85.2 0.00 85.2 85.2 85.2 132,725
Option Plan τOP 0.15 0.73 0.00 0.00 0.00 132,725
qOP 91.8 0.00 91.8 91.8 91.8 132,725
Private Taxation τPRIV 11.54 8.48 3.99 10.86 16.83 132,725
qPRIV 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 132,725
Panel B: By Tax Bracket
Tax Plan Var. Mean SD P25 P50 P75 N
Tax Bracket 1
Standard Plan τSP 0.27 0.74 0.00 0.00 0.00 94,950
qSP 82.4 0.00 82.4 82.4 82.4 94,950
Option Plan τOP 0.10 0.54 0.00 0.00 0.00 94,950
qOP 93.5 0.00 93.5 93.5 93.5 94,950
Private Taxation τPRIV 9.64 7.29 3.19 8.38 15.08 94,950
qPRIV 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 94,950
Tax Bracket 2
Standard Plan τSP 0.24 0.96 0.00 0.00 0.00 24,675
qSP 91.6 0.00 91.6 91.6 91.6 24,675
Option Plan τOP 0.23 0.89 0.00 0.00 0.00 24,675
qOP 87.7 0.00 87.7 87.7 87.7 24,675
Private Taxation τPRIV 14.11 8.66 7.59 11.57 18.41 24,675
qPRIV 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 24,675
Tax Bracket 3
Standard Plan τSP 0.25 1.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 13,100
qSP 93.2 0.00 93.2 93.2 93.2 13,100
Option Plan τOP 0.37 1.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 13,100
qOP 87.3 0.00 87.3 87.3 87.3 13,100
Private Taxation τPRIV 20.44 9.20 13.52 23.29 27.52 13,100
qPRIV 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 13,100
treatment of business transfers leads to a less progressive tax scheme. For example, the
difference in average effective tax rates between small and large transfers is only 0.43%
under the option plan (1.61% under the standard plan), compared to 11.65% under private
taxation.18
We have seen that employment tax credits have a large impact on the effective tax
burden. As employment tax credits are tied to the development of employment expenses,
we next look at the sensitivity of the preferred tax treatment toward a negative economic
development. We therefore rerun our analyses from Table 4 under the recession scenario.
The results are reported in Table 5.19 The results show that even under negative economic
18 Note that the results for large transfers reported in Panel C in Table 4 are identical to the ones in
Table 3 as all transfers with a property value above 2.5 million euro would lead to a tax payment
under private taxation.
19 Note that the effective tax rates under private taxation remain unchanged compared to Table 4
as private taxation does not provide any tax reductions based on the development of employment
expenses.
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Table 4: Simulation Results - Base Scenario (continued)
Panel C: By Value of Transferred Property
Tax Plan Var. Mean SD P25 P50 P75 N
Small
Standard Plan τSP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 50,225
qSP 100.0 0.00 100.0 100.0 100.0 50,225
Option Plan τOP 0.10 0.57 0.00 0.00 0.00 50,225
qOP 94.0 0.00 94.0 94.0 94.0 50,225
Private Taxation τPRIV 9.76 8.62 1.44 8.16 17.35 50,225
qPRIV 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 50,225
Medium
Standard Plan τSP 0.04 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 62,800
qSP 96.4 0.00 96.4 96.4 96.4 62,800
Option Plan τOP 0.07 0.51 0.00 0.00 0.00 62,800
qOP 96.1 0.00 96.1 96.1 96.1 62,800
Private Taxation τPRIV 9.87 6.63 4.1 8.52 13.85 62,800
qPRIV 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 62,800
Large
Standard Plan τSP 1.61 1.43 0.41 1.29 2.48 19,700
qSP 11.4 0.00 11.4 11.4 11.4 19,700
Option Plan τOP 0.53 1.34 0.00 0.00 0.10 19,700
qOP 73.0 0.00 73.0 73.0 73.0 19,700
Private Taxation τPRIV 21.41 6.38 16.82 17.78 26.40 19,700
qPRIV 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 19,700
This table provides effective tax rates and the percentage of transfers with a zero tax rate based on the
transfers that would result in a tax payment if only the valid rules for transfers of private property would
be applied. τSP , τOP , τPRIV denote effective tax rates under the standard plan, the option plan, and in
the absence of any preferential treatment for business transfers, respectively. qSP , qOP , qPRIV denote the
percentage of transfers with a zero effective tax rate under each tax treatment. All values are reported
in percent. For each business transfer, 25 employment expense paths are simulated according to the base
scenario described in Section 3.2. Panel A is based on all 132,725 runs that result in a tax payment under
private taxation. Panels B and C show summary statistics for subsamples by tax bracket and size of
transferred property.
circumstances the preferential rules for business property provide a large reduction of the
effective tax burden. However, the employment tax credits, especially the option plan,
are highly sensitive towards a worsening economic environment. Panel C of Table 5 shows
that the effective tax rate of large transfers rises to 1.97% under a recession scenario if
the option plan is chosen. This represents not only a significant increase compared to the
0.53% that result under the base scenario (see Panel C of Table 4). The average effective
tax rate and the percentage of transfers which result in a tax payment are also higher
under the option plan than under the standard plan.20 Thus, the strong tax advantage
provided by the option plan under the base scenario is not preserved under a recession
scenario. The sharp increase of the mean effective tax rate under the option plan can
be attributed to the design of this tax credit alternative. The option plan requires tax
payments only if the level of employment expenses declines during the years after the
20 However, the median tax rate under the option plan is still lower than the one under the standard
plan.
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Table 5: Simulation Results - Recession Scenario
Panel A: Full Sample
Tax Plan Var. Mean SD P25 P50 P75 N
Full Sample
Standard Plan τSP 0.32 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 132,725
qSP 84.2 0.00 84.2 84.2 84.2 132,725
Option Plan τOP 0.59 1.58 0.00 0.00 0.00 132,725
qOP 77.4 0.00 77.4 77.4 77.4 132,725
Private Taxation τPRIV 11.54 8.48 3.99 10.86 16.83 132,725
qPRIV 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 132,725
Panel B: By Tax Bracket
Tax Plan Var. Mean SD P25 P50 P75 N
Tax Bracket 1
Standard Plan τSP 0.33 0.92 0.00 0.00 0.00 94,950
qSP 81.2 0.00 81.2 81.2 81.2 94,950
Option Plan τOP 0.40 1.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 94,950
qOP 81.3 0.00 81.3 81.3 81.3 94,950
Private Taxation τPRIV 9.64 7.29 3.19 8.38 15.08 94,950
qPRIV 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 94,950
Tax Bracket 2
Standard Plan τSP 0.28 1.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 24,675
qSP 91.3 0.00 91.3 91.3 91.3 24,675
Option Plan τOP 0.87 1.86 0.00 0.00 0.87 24,675
qOP 67.1 0.00 67.1 67.1 67.1 24,675
Private Taxation τPRIV 14.11 8.66 7.59 11.57 18.41 24,675
qPRIV 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 24,675
Tax Bracket 3
Standard Plan τSP 0.29 1.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 13,100
qSP 92.7 0.00 92.7 92.7 92.7 13,100
Option Plan τOP 1.38 2.63 0.00 0.00 1.69 13,100
qOP 67.7 0.00 67.7 67.7 67.7 13,100
Private Taxation τPRIV 20.44 9.2 13.52 23.29 27.52 13,100
qPRIV 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 13,100
succession. As the historical industry average that underlies the base scenario entails a
moderate increase in employment expenses, such a decline is a rather rare event. Under
a recession scenario, employment expenses decrease, causing higher tax payments. In
contrast, the standard plan requires an upfront payment if the amount of tax individual
exemptions is exceeded. At the same time, the employment expense threshold is less
restrictive, leaving even firms with a moderate decline of employment expenses in the
years following the succession without additional tax payments.
5 Robustness tests
5.1 Multivariate analysis
As a robustness check, we additionally consider the impact of our variables of interest in
a multivariate framework. This is appropriate as it enables us to analyze the marginal
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Table 5: Simulation Results - Recession Scenario (continued)
Panel C: By Value of Transferred Property
Tax Plan Var. Mean SD P25 P50 P75 N
Small
Standard Plan τSP 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 50,225
qSP 100.0 0.00 100.0 100.0 100.0 50,225
Option Plan τOP 0.43 1.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 50,225
qOP 82.1 0.00 82.1 82.1 82.1 50,225
Private Taxation τPRIV 9.76 8.62 1.44 8.16 17.35 50,225
qPRIV 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 50,225
Medium
Standard Plan τSP 0.07 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.00 62,800
qSP 94.9 0.00 94.9 94.9 94.9 62,800
Option Plan τOP 0.28 1.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 62,800
qOP 86.9 0.00 86.9 86.9 86.9 62,800
Private Taxation τPRIV 9.87 6.63 4.1 8.52 13.85 62,800
qPRIV 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 62,800
Large
Standard Plan τSP 1.93 1.76 0.51 1.71 2.66 19,700
qSP 9.9 0.00 9.9 9.9 9.9 19,700
Option Plan τOP 1.97 2.51 0.00 0.91 3.28 19,700
qOP 34.9 0.00 34.9 34.9 34.9 19,700
Private Taxation τPRIV 21.41 6.38 16.82 17.78 26.40 19,700
qPRIV 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 19,700
This table provides effective tax rates and the percentage of transfers with a zero tax rate based on
the transfers that would result in a tax payment if only the valid rules for transfers of private property
would be applied. τSP , τOP , τPRIV denote effective tax rates under the standard plan, the option plan,
and in the absence of any preferential treatment for business transfers, respectively. qSP , qOP , qPRIV
denote the percentage of transfers with a zero effective tax rate under each tax treatment. All values are
reported in percent. For each business transfer, 25 employment expense paths are simulated according to
the recession scenario described in Section 3.2. Panel A is based on all 132,725 runs that result in a tax
payment under private taxation. Panels B and C show summary statistics for subsamples by tax bracket
and size of transferred property.
effects of a change to a less favorable tax bracket (compared to tax bracket 1), a larger
size of the transferred property, and the choice of the option instead of the standard plan,
while holding all other factors constant. We present results from logistic regressions in
columns (1) and (2) of Table 6, where taxpay is an indicator variable equal to one if
the expected tax payments are positive, and zero otherwise. Variables of interest are
the determinants of the tax burden discussed in the previous sections.21 To compare the
effects under different economic circumstances, column (1) is based on the base scenario
and column (2) is based on the recession scenario.22 ∆(1)−(2) provides the difference
between the coefficients shown in columns (1) and (2). The multivariate results confirm
our findings from the previous sections. For example, while controlling for the value of the
transferred property, the probability to pay taxes significantly increases the more distant
21 Since we conjointly include the runs for the option and the standard plan in our estimations, we
suppress the subscripts used in the previous sections.
22 Estimating split regressions for each scenario allows for differences in the slopes of the coefficients.
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the family relationship between legator and successor. Therefore, both variables have
incremental explanatory power with regard to the effective tax burden. While the option
plan provides for a significantly lower probability to pay taxes than the standard plan
under the base scenario, its sensitivity toward a decrease in employment expenses leads
to a higher probability under a recession scenario. Comparing the regression coefficients
from columns (1) and (2) shows that the effects of falling into a specific tax bracket,
property size, and fiscal choice interact with the economic development. In addition to
the descriptive results from the previous section, the negative values of ∆(1)−(2) show
that the influences of a more distant family relationship and of the property size on the
probability to pay taxes are more pronounced under a recession scenario.23
Table 6: Multivariate Analysis by Economic Scenario
Variables Dependent variable = taxpay Dependent variable = τ
(1) (2) ∆(1)−(2) (3) (4) ∆(3)−(4)
Tax Bracket 2 3.110 4.504 -1.394 3.277 5.051 -1.774
(< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001)
Tax Bracket 3 3.109 4.446 -1.337 3.746 5.820 -2.074
(< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001)
Log(X) 1.682 1.984 -0.302 1.600 2.104 -0.504
(< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001)
Option Plan -1.204 0.862 -2.066 -0.680 1.366 -2.046
(< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001)
Constant -14.485 -16.882 2.397 -14.433 -18.967 4.534
(< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001)
N 740,000 740,000 740,000 740,000
Pseudo-R2 0.562 0.599 0.431 0.408
This table provides results from logistic and tobit regressions based on all business transfers provided
in the German Inheritance Tax Statistic of 2011. P -values (based on transfer-level clustered standard
errors) are reported in parentheses. The first two columns report coefficients from logit regressions using
taxpay as dependent variable. taxpay equals one if a run results in a tax payment and zero otherwise.
Column (1) is based on the base scenario, column (2) on the recession scenario. ∆(1)−(2) compares
the coefficients from columns (1) and (2); χ2-tests reject the null hypothesis of equal coefficients for all
variables. Columns (3) and (4) report results from tobit regressions that use the effective tax rate τ
as dependent variable. Column (3) is based on the base scenario, column (4) on the recession scenario.
∆(3)−(4) compares the coefficients from columns (3) and (4). χ
2-tests reject the null hypothesis of equal
coefficients for all variables.
Columns (3) and (4) present the results from tobit regressions, where we use the effec-
tive tax rate τ as a dependent variable. As tax payments cannot be negative by definition,
we use a censored regression model instead of standard OLS regressions to avoid estima-
tion bias. The positive coefficients from the two regressions and the difference between the
23 Note that our multivariate analyses are based on all transfers included in the German Inheritance
Statistic of 2011, while section 4.2 relies on a subsample containing only transfers with positive tax
payments under private taxation.
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regression coefficients (∆(3)−(4)) confirm that distant relatives have a significantly higher
effective tax rate under a recession scenario. Further, the tax wedge between tax brackets
1 and the higher tax brackets increases. The impact of transferring a more valuable estate
is also bigger under a recession scenario, indicating that employment tax credits lead to
a more progressive tax schedule compared to the base scenario. The tax advantage from
choosing the option plan reverses under a negative economic development.
As presented in Section 4 the effects of employment tax credits depend on the value
of the transferred estate. Hence, we analyze the effect of the property value in a multi-
variate framework. We report results of separate logistic and tobit regressions in Table
7. Columns (1) to (3) show the results of logistic regressions using taxpay as dependent
variable, and columns (4) to (6) report the results of tobit regressions with τ as dependent
variable. We follow the classification introduced in Table 3, Panel C. That is, we esti-
mate separate regressions based on transfers with a property values up to 500,000 euro in
columns (1) and (4), between 0.5 million euro and 2.5 million euro in columns (2) and (5),
and transfers exceeding 2.5 million euro in columns (3) and (6). All regressions include
the standard and the option plan, as well as both the base and the recession scenario.
∆(1)−(3) and ∆(4)−(6) compare the coefficients from the regressions that are based on small
and large properties. χ2-tests (not reported) confirm that all differences are significant at
the 1% level.
The significant differences ∆(1)−(3) and ∆(4)−(6) suggest that the effects of the legator-
successor relationship, the development of employment expenses, and the optimal choice
of an employment tax credit alternative depend on the size of the transferred property.
The positive impact of falling into a higher tax bracket on both the probability to pay
taxes and the effective tax rate is significantly higher for small transfers than for large
transfers. Unreported results from a comparison between tobit regressions of the effective
tax rate under private taxation and under the preferential treatment of business transfers
confirm our prior finding that this effect is not simply due to the structure of the statutory
tax rate schedule. Thus, employment tax credits alleviate the additional tax burden on
higher inheritance tax brackets. The significant positive differences (1.105 and 1.859) of
the coefficients for Log(X) show that within the respective groups, the marginal impact
of a larger estate value on the probability and the effective tax rate is also lower for
large transfers than for small ones. With regard to tax planning, the results of Table 7
show that the option plan might be favorable for the transfer of large estates. However,
note that the option plan is sensitive to the underlying economic scenario. For a typical
economic development, the option plan should provide for a lower effective tax rate as
shown in Table 6. As the regressions in Table 7 pool equal numbers of observations
from the base and the regression scenario most likely overemphasize the importance of a
negative economic development.
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Table 7: Multivariate Analysis by Value of Transferred Property
Variables Dependent variable = taxpay Dependent variable = τ
(1) (2) (3) ∆(1)−(3) (4) (5) (6) ∆(4)−(6)
Tax Bracket 2 5.455 4.678 0.838 4.617 7.796 5.998 2.417 5.379
(< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001)
Tax Bracket 3 5.467 4.693 1.019 4.448 8.525 6.81 3.183 5.342
(< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001)
Log(X) 1.820 3.247 0.715 1.105 2.843 3.692 0.984 1.859
(< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001)
Recession 1.646 1.451 1.323 0.323 2.475 1.837 1.335 1.140
(< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001)
Option Plan 8.358 1.118 -2.632 10.990 11.553 1.743 -1.284 12.837
(< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001)
Constant -25.040 -28.206 -4.656 -20.384 -37.600 -33.312 -8.054 -29.546
(< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001)
N 1,135,400 265,800 78,800 1,135,400 265,800 78,800
Pseudo-R2 0.586 0.420 0.284 0.439 0.323 0.121
This table provides results from logistic and tobit regressions based on all business transfers provided
in the German Inheritance Tax Statistic of 2011. P -values (based on transfer-level clustered standard
errors) are reported in parentheses. The first three columns report coefficients from logit regressions using
taxpay as dependent variable. taxpay equals one if a run results in a tax payment and zero otherwise.
Column (1) only considers transfers up to 500,000 euro, column (2) transfers between 500,000 and 2.5
million euro, and column (3) transfers above 2.5 million euro. ∆(1)−(3) compares the coefficients from
columns (1) and (3); χ2-tests reject the null hypothesis of equal coefficients for all variables. Columns
(4) to (6) report results from tobit regressions that use the effective tax rate τ as dependent variable.
Column (4) only considers transfers up to 500,000 euro, column (5) transfers between 500,000 and 2.5
million euro, and column (6) transfers above 2.5 million euro. ∆(4)−(6) compares the coefficients from
columns (4) and (6); χ2-tests reject the null hypothesis of equal coefficients for all variables.
5.2 Endogeneity of employment expenses
The two tax credit alternatives have been introduced to avoid additional liquidity strains
that might have an impact on employment. Further, they could even create incentives
to increase employment expenses beyond the level that is optimal under a non-tax envi-
ronment. This entails a potential endogeneity issue, since we assume that employment
expenses are determined for non-tax reasons.
To address this concern, we first calculate the marginal tax reduction that could be
achieved by marginally increasing aggregated employment expenses under the standard
plan and the option plan,WSP andWOP . Therefore, we compute the first-order derivatives
of (3) and (4) with respect to WSP and WOP , respectively. We then take the argument
that maximizes the potential savings from an increase in employment expenses.24 We then
compare the potential marginal tax savings with the additional employment expenses.
Thereby, we consider a 20% employer’s share in social security contributions. These
contributions are not included in the calculation of W for tax purposes. However, the
successor would include these contributions as cost in his employment decision. Therefore,
24 According to the our approach in the previous sections we assume r to equal zero.
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for the standard plan, a marginal increase in employment expenses would be economically
useful, if
w0
X
≤
0.85 · tSP
4.8
. (6)
If the option plan is chosen, marginal tax reductions overcompensate additional em-
ployment expenses, if
w0
X
≤
tOP
8.4
. (7)
As firm-specific data on the actual employment expenses paid by our sample firms
in the years preceding the transfer, w0, is not available, we evaluate the extent of the
endogeneity problem by estimating the fraction of w0 to X under both scenarios by using
the tax rates tSP and tOP . Consequently, we compute the maximum ratio of w0 to X so
that a given percentage of firms would have an incentive to increase employment only for
tax reasons if their simulated ratios are below the respective threshold.
Table 8: Incentives to Increase Employment Expenses
p = 20% p = 10% p = 5% p = 4% p = 3% p = 2% p = 1%
Base Scenario Standard Plan 0 0.021 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.041 0.053
Option Plan 0 0 0.018 0.018 0.023 0.024 0.036
Recession Scenario Standard Plan 0 0.027 0.034 0.034 0.035 0.041 0.053
Option Plan 0.013 0.023 0.024 0.030 0.036 0.036 0.036
This table provides thresholds for the fractions of w0 to X so that simulation runs with a ratio below the
threshold have incentives to increase the level of employment expenses for tax reasons. Thereby, p is the
percentage of simulation runs that have incentives to increase employment for tax reasons. Thresholds
are computed separately for both the standard and the option plan under the base scenario and the
recession scenario.
The results reported in Table 8 show that only highly capital intensive businesses might
have an incentive to increase employment over the level that would be optimal under a
non-tax environment. For example, the threshold of 5.3% at the 1% level means that 1%
of the runs would provide incentives to voluntarily increase employment if the ratio of
average employment expenses to the value of transferred property for the respective firms
is below this critical value.25 Under the option plan, this threshold is even lower (3.6% of
the property value). While we can still not rule out all endogeneity concerns completely,
it is very unlikely that firms fall below this threshold. An exception (if any) might be a
few (if any) large and capital-intensive firms that are subject to a high tax rate. From
a public policy perspective, the analysis also indicates that the current preferential tax
treatment does not provide material incentives to increase employment.
25 For example, if we assume the average equity ratio for German SMEs in 2012 of 27.4% (Kreditanstalt
fu¨r Wiederaufbau (2013)), a business with annual employment expenses of 800,000 euro would only
meet the threshold if its property value exceeded 55.089 million euro.
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6 Conclusion
This study provides a comprehensive overview on the effects of employment tax credits for
business transfers on the effective tax burden. Based on micro-level data from the German
Inheritance Tax Statistic of 2011, we calculate effective tax rates resulting under two
different economic scenarios for both tax credit alternatives that are provided by German
inheritance tax law. The simulation considers in detail the design of the two alternatives as
well as specific tax exemptions granted for business transfers. We evaluate the implications
of employment tax credits by comparing the effective tax rates for business transfers with
the tax burden that would result under a non-preferential treatment.
The first part of the analysis provides evidence on the expected tax effects based on
the characteristics of all inheritance tax cases included in the German Inheritance Tax
Statistic. The results show that both the probability to pay taxes and the effective tax
rate are strongly affected by the preferential treatment of business property. For example,
the average effective tax rate is reduced from 4.14% for private transfers to 0.05% if the
most favorable employment tax credit alternative is used. Moreover, tax reductions are
not granted uniformly to all tax brackets. The tax wedge between transfers among close
relatives and among distant relatives, i.e, low and high inheritance tax brackets, is sig-
nificantly reduced compared to the treatment under private taxation. Last, employment
tax credits smoothen the progressivity of the inheritance taxation and allow 73% of the
large transfers to remain untaxed.
Next, we focus on a subsample of transfers that would be taxed under private taxation.
These transfers are of particular interest as they are the ones that can potentially benefit
from employment tax credits. As expected, our prior findings that employment tax credits
strongly reduce the effective tax burden and smooth the differences between high and
low tax brackets as well as large and small transfers are confirmed. In addition, we
show that the tax reduction is significantly smaller under a negative economic scenario.
We additionally run multivariate tests where we consider the impact of the different
determinants of the effective tax burden simultaneously. The robustness checks confirm
our previous findings. With regard to fiscal planning, we find that the option plan,
which allows for zero tax payments if expense thresholds are met, is advantageous under
most circumstances. Last, we address the possibility that employment expenses could
be endogenously determined. Based on our simulation results we show that the current
inheritance tax legislation provides little if any incentives to increase employment beyond
the level that would be chosen for non-tax reasons.
The proper design and the usefulness of employment tax credits are subject to cur-
rent political discussions in both the US and in Europe. Moreover, the German Federal
Constitutional Court has to decide on whether the provisions analyzed in this study are
consistent with the German constitution. Therefore, evidence on the fiscal effects of em-
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ployment tax credits is useful both for political and judicial purposes. The results of
this study can help to substantiate discussions on the costs and benefits of employment
tax credits. Specifically, they show that a change of the current legislation is likely to
affect succession planning as transfers to unrelated successors would probably be subject
to a significantly higher effective tax rate. Moreover, they highlight the effects of employ-
ment tax credits on tax progressivity. Summarizing, transfers of large business properties
among distant relatives or unrelated parties benefit from employment tax credits under
non-recession conditions. Further, our results suggest pro-cyclical effects of the analyzed
employment tax credits.
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